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et al.: Prisoners' Rights Litigation: An Examination into the Appurtenant

PRISONERS' RIGHTS LITIGATION: AN
EXAMINATION INTO THE APPURTENANT
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Experience teaches that nothing so provokes trouble for the
management of a penal institution as a hopeless feeling among
inmates that they are without opportunity to voice grievances
or to obtain redress for abusive or oppressive treatment.'
Although a prisoner has been duly tried, convicted, and sentenced, he is not divested of all constitutional rights after the
prison gates close behind him. Except to the extent that the
recision or restriction of certain rights is a necessary concommitant of incarceration, justified by considerations underlying the
penal system, all other constitutionally protected rights are retained in prison. When these rights are violated by conditions of
confinement, federal judicial review of internal prison practices
may be sought by invoking one of two procedures provided by
Congress for the redress of such violations.
This paper explores the emerging procedural issues confronted by state prisoners seeking vindication of their constitutional rights in the context of a habeas corpus petition 2 and a suit
under the Civil Rights Act.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983:3 Nature of the Suit
More than a decade ago, in a monumental decision which
was to materially alter the plight of prison inmates who could not
protect themselves against even the most onerous of prison practices, the United States Supreme Court brought the Civil Rights
Act into the field of tort litigation by holding that § 1983 of that
Act gave individual citizens a viable federal remedy, utilizing
federal courts, for the deprivation of federally secured rights by
1. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
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persons acting under color of state law.' Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas summarized the purpose of § 1983:1
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason
of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Lower federal courts, faced with assessing the propriety of a prisoners' rights suit brought under § 1983, have affirmed its use in
permitting redress in federal court for the tortious deprivation of
rights secured by the fourteenth amendment by any state official
acting under color of state authority.'
Persons in prison are within the protection of § 1983 and
violations of the constitutional rights of inmates are cognizable
in federal court under this section of the Civil Rights Act.7 However, lest it appear that the Civil Rights Act is a panacea for
abuses often inflicted upon prison inmates, § 1983 does prescribe
two elements as prerequisites for recovery: (1) the conduct complained of must be by someone acting under color of state law and
(2) the conduct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
1) Under Color of State Law: Action taken by a state official purporting to exercise the power vested in him by virtue of
state law and made possible only due to the fact that he is clothed
with the authority of state law is action under color of state law
for purposes of the Civil Rights Act.9 It has, however, been held
4. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
5. Id. at 180.
6. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 368 F. 2d 992 (9th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Diamond
v. Social Service Dep't., 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F.
Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967).
7. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.519 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967);
Brown v. Brown, 368 F. 2d 992 (9th Cir. 1966); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F. 2d 314 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F. 2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963);
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States ex rel. Diamond
v. Social Service Dep't., 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
8. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
9. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443,
445 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd, 445 F. 2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971);'ldberts v. Pepersack, 256 F.
Supp. 415, 422-23 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967)..
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that to act "under color" of state law does not require that the
misconduct complained of be by an officer of the state. It is sufficient that it was effected by a willful participant in joint activity
with the state or its agents."°
2) Deprivation of Constitutional Rights: Where the conduct
complained of does not infringe upon fundamental constitutional
rights, federal courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of
a state or federal penal institution." Only deprivations of individual rights derived from the Federal Constitution or federal laws
give rise to actions under the federal Civil Rights Act. Thus, a
violation of a state constitution or statute is not a basis for an
action under § 1983.12
A brief survey of what is and is not actionable may serve as
a guide. Generally, the right infringed upon must be one secured
by the due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Among the most important of these rights is the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment of the sort
that contravenes the eighth amendment thereby going beyond
matters exclusively and legitimately related to prison discipline
and administration. 3 However, isolated incidents of negligent
failure to protect one inmate from an attack by another, do not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment and, absent a showing
of bad faith and the existence of an oppressive motive, do not
subject an inmate to a denial of the equal protection of the laws."
Intentional deprivation of essential medical care is actionable,'" but improper medical care is not 6 unless it rises to the
proportions of cruel and unusual punishment.17 Interference with
10. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F. 2d 1 (3d Cir.
1973).
11. Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F. 2d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
915 (1970); Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962).
12. Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F. 2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964);
Saunders v. Cahill, 359 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921
(D. Colo. 1962).
13. E.g., Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F. 2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970); Courtney v. Bishop,
409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1968); Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hancock v.
Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
14. Williams v. Field, 416 F. 2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 1016 (1970);
see also Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
15. Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
16. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F. 2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
17. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), rev'g 427 F. 2d 71 (7th Cir. 1970); Martinez
v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970); see Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb.
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a prisoner's right of access to the courts,' 8 interference with the
adherence to religious beliefs,' 9 the denial of statutory good time
behavior credit, 2 and interference with the right to the assistance
of counsel, including the opportunity for full and private communications between attorney and client, 2' are generally actionable
violations. Interference with a prisoner's attempts to remain
knowledgable of world affairs, 2 regulations requiring shaving and
hair cutting, 23 and conduct which may be tortious, but does not
violate the Federal Constitution, and is therefore, of interest to
the state only, such as intentional assaults on prisoners by
guards, do not give rise to actions under § 1983.24 Furthermore,
even when a prison regulation infringes on fundamental constitutional rights retained by inmates, a federal court must balance
the asserted need for the regulation in the context of prison security and orderly administration against the claimed constitu2
tional right and the degree to which it has been impaired. 1
3) Nature of the Liability: According to one court, two elements of personal liability are requisites to recovery: (1) violation
of a federally secured right and (2) requisite degree of culpability. 2 Liability under the federal Civil Rights Act is personal; one
is liable only if he had a direct connection with the alleged deprivation. Thus, a warden was not held liable to a former prisoner
for personal injuries and the deprivation of civil rights, when he
was not yet warden when the injuries were sustained.27 In a
lengthy examination of the nature of the §1983 liability, one federal court expressed reluctance to subject officials to the fear of
1970), aff'd 445 F. 2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971).
18. Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F. 2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.920 (1964).
19. E.g., Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 445 F. 2d 801 (5th
Cir. 1971).
20. Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970), aff'd, 445 F. 2d 818 (8th Cir.
1971).
21. Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Smith v. Robbins, 328 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971), afl'd, 454 F. 2d 696 (lst Cir. 1972).
22. Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd 445 F. 2d 801 (5th Cir.
1971).
23. Daugherty v. Reagan, 446 F. 2d 75 (9th Cir. 1971); Blake v. Pryse, 444 F. 2d 218
(8th Cir. 1971).
24. Cole v. Smith, 344 F. 2d 721 (8th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Atterbury v.
Ragen, 237 F. 2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956).
25. Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971), aff'd, 454 F. 2d 696 (1st Cir.
1972).
26. Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
27. Miller v. Swenson, 315 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Mo. 1970). See also Lathan v. Oswald,
359 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
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reprisal for honest misunderstandings of statutory authority and
mere errors in judgment. This court interpreted the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape" to indicate that
§ 1983, as a basis for a civil suit, must be read against the background of tort liability which holds a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions. The Court held that under
general principles of tort liability, it is sufficient that a reasonable
man might have foreseen the result of his actions.2 9 Section 1983
affords recovery to citizens injured by the conduct of state officers
whether such conduct is willful, negligent or irresponsible." The
necessary element for recovery is the same as that required in
other actions. That element is negligence, the failure to act as a
reasonable man. The only difference is that in suits under the
Civil Rights Act, the determination of reasonableness is left to the
courts: the community does not set the standards of care which
reasonably prudent men should exercise. The court further held
that good faith reliance on a state statute later declared invalid
is available as a defense to a tort action brought under § 1983,
because the natural consequences do not include the invalidation
of a statute. However, reckless or unreasonable action taken
under color of state law subjects a state official to liability regardless of the validity of the statute. The Supreme Court subse3
quently announced an identical holding in a different case .
B.

The Scope of Habeas Corpus

Initially the writ of habeas corpus permitted only a challenge
to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and
the person. The scope of the Great Writ gradually expanded and,
in 1942, the Supreme Court announced that the writ applied to
all cases where a conviction had been obtained in violation of
constitutional rights and where the writ is the only adequate
means of preserving those rights.3 2 After a federal circuit court
28. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
29. Roberts v. Pepersack, 265 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877
(1967).
30. Accord, Williams v. Field, 416 F. 2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1016 (1970). Contra, Kent v. Prasse, 265 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa. 1967), afj'd, 385 F. 2d
406 (3d Cir. 1967) (no recovery for prisoner who suffered amputation of four fingers of his
right hand due to the erratic operation of a grossly defective machine, while performing
mandatory prison work).
31. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (policemen not liable for unconstitutional
arrest if they acted with good faith and probable cause under a state statute later declared
invalid); accord, McKinney v. DeBord, 324 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
32. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
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acknowledged that:3
A prisoner is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus when, though
lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some right to which he is
lawfully entitled even in his confinement, the deprivation of
which serves to make his imprisonment more burdensome than
the law allows or curtails his liberty to a greater extent than the
law permits,
the permissibility of challenging prison conditions by means of a
habeas corpus petition was given recognition by the Supreme
Court.3 4 Treating a "motion for lawbooks and a typewriter" as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court declared
that a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from assisting other
inmates in the preparation of writs was violative of federally secured and protected rights and therefore invalid. Citing this landmark decision, the Supreme Court later held that pleadings challenging conditions of confinement are cognizable in federal habeas corpus.5
Thus, habeas corpus relief is currently available to one who
claims he should be freed of all restraints and also to one who
protests his confinement in a certain place or attacks the conditions of his confinement. 3 Indeed, habeas corpus proceedings
have been successful in securing to prison inmates many of the
same constitutional rights vindicated by litigation brought by
way of a § 1983 suit.3 7 Further, several courts have implied that,
assuming procedural requirements are met, habeas corpus could
be used in suits inappropriately brought under the Civil Rights
3
Act.
33. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F. 2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
34. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
35. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
36. E.g., Walters v. Henderson, 352 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ga. 1972). But see, Royster
v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 263
(1973).

37. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cottle v. Wainwright,
477 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973) (counsel at parole revocation hearing); Coonts v. Wainwright,
282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968) (access to the courts); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F. 2d 428,
(4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966) (exercise of religious beliefs); Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F. 2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) (cruel and
unusual punishment).
38. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus proceeding is exclusive
means to seek restoration of good time credits); De Witt v. Pail, 366 F. 2d 682, 686 (9th
Cir. 1966) (Allegation that prison officials had confiscated legal papers necessary to pris.
oner's appeal from his conviction as a disciplinary measure might be the basis for commencing a proceeding for writ of habeas corpus).
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Nevertheless, § 1983 is still generally considered preferable
to habeas corpus for several reasons:
(1) Exhaustion of state remedies is probably not a prerequisite to the commencement of a federal action under § 1983;
(2) The propriety of proceeding as a class in a habeas corpus action is subject to considerable dispute;
(3) Courts have the power to fashion remedies and grant
equitable relief in a § 1983 suit;
(4) Discovery techniques provided by the Fed. R. Civ. P.
can be resorted to routinely in suits brought pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act.
In the sections which follow, an examination of the relative
utility of § 1983 and habeas corpus, in the context of the aforementioned procedural problems and virtues should reveal which,
if either, should take precedence in prisoners' rights litigation.
II.

EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES

A.

Habeas Corpus

Federal courts have refused to consider habeas corpus applications by state prisoners until they have exhausted all remedies
available in state courts.39 This qualification is now codified in
the federal habeas corpus statute." The requirement is grounded
in the doctrine of comity between courts, a doctrine that teaches
that one court should defer action on cases properly within its
jurisdiction until courts of another sovereignty, with concurrent
powers and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass on it.4 However, the doctrine of exhaustion
gives states only an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct
alleged violations of an inmate's constitutional rights. An applicant is not required to file repetitious applications in the state
courts.42 Once a claim has been presented to the highest state
court on direct appeal of the conviction, an applicant need not,
prior to obtaining federal habeas corpus relief, request collateral
relief based on the same issues already decided,4 3 as long as the
claim advanced in federal court was presented for consideration
to the state court. 44
39.
40.
41.
42.
Ross v.
43.
44.

Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (Supp. IV. 1969 amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254 1964).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Craven, 478 F. 2d 240 (9th Cir. 1973).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
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A petitioner barred from further state relief due to his failure
to make a timely appeal of his conviction was not denied federal
habeas corpus relief despite the exhaustion requirement, inasmuch as that requirement applies only to currently available
state remedies. " Federal courts have the power to grant relief
despite a failure to pursue state remedies not available at the
time the application for federal habeas corpus was filed.46 Nevertheless, where an adequate state post-conviction remedy becomes
available after a habeas corpus proceeding has begun, even
though state remedies existing previously had been exhausted,
principles of comity require a federal court to dismiss without
prejudice and remand the cause to the state courts for their consideration."
Still, the mere possibility of success in an additional state
proceeding does not bar federal habeas corpus relief where the
availability of further state remedies is uncertain. Where the
state courts have consistently refused to hear challenges by prisoners to the conditions of their confinement, regardless of the
remedy sought, an applicant is not required to pursue any alternative procedure before seeking federal habeas corpus.
B.

§ 1983

The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape indicated
that the federal remedy provided by § 1983 is supplementary to
state remedies and thus, the latter need not be sought and refused
before the federal remedy is invoked. 9 Defining the purposes of
§ 1983, in Monroe, as being, (1) to override certain kinds of state
laws, (2) to provide a remedy where the state law is inadequate
or a state remedy is not available in practice and (3) to provide a
remedy supplementary to those furnished by the state, the Supreme Court later noted that these purposes would be frustrated
by application of the exhaustion doctrine. The Court therefore
held that relief under the Civil Rights Act is not defeated because
relief was not first sought under a state law which provided a
remedy. 0 Thereafter, the Supreme Court has consistently held
45. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
46. Id.
47. Stepp v. Beto, 398 F. 2d 814 (5th Cir. 1968); Texas v. Payton, 390 F. 2d 261 (5th
Cir. 1968).
48. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); cf. Layton v. Carson, 479 F. 2d 1275
(5th Cir. 1973).
49. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
50. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
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the doctrine of exhaustion inapplicable in civil rights actions."
Generally, where an action is brought under the Civil Rights
Act, exhaustion of state remedies is not a condition precedent to
federal jurisdiction.52 Further, while one federal circuit court previously entertained doubts as to whether the exhaustion requirement should not be imposed when equitable relief is sought and
there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law," it later
held that exhaustion of state legal or equitable remedies is not
necessary before commencement of a civil rights action.-"
Nevertheless, three federal courts have required that inmates
either exhaust state administrative remedies or make a showing
that they are unavailable before resorting to the federal judiciary.5 In another federal circuit, the exhaustion of state remedies
is not required unless there is an adequate remedy set up to
provide a speedy and fair hearing of prisoners' grievances. 6 Moreover, in still another federal circuit, the exhaustion of administrative remedies generally has been required before federal prisoners
57
may resort to judicial relief.
51. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516-517 n. 18 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416 (1967).
52. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, sub
nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Jones v. Decker, 436 F. 2d 954 (5th Cir.
1970); Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F. 2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970); Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d
519 (2nd Cir. 1967); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F. 2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Basista v. Weir, 340
F. 2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal.
1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Krist v. Smith, 309 F.
Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd 439 F. 2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F.
Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp.
945 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); United States
ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp.
124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
53. Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (here, however, civil death
statutes precluded adequate relief in New York).
54. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. Griffin v. Turner, 288 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Burns v. Swenson, 288 F.
Supp. 4 (W.D. Mo. 1968), reo'd in part, modified in part, on othergrounds, 430 F. 2d 771
(8th Cir. 1970); Cupp v. Swenson, 288 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (court will abstain until
a final administrative determination of prisoner's claim is made in order to give new rules
establishing a grievance procedure an opportunity to correct alleged deprivations); United
States ex rel. Oakes v. Taylor, 269 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States ex rel.
Diamond v. Social Service Dep't., 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States ex rel.
Wakely v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
56. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314
F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
57. Paden v. United States, 430 F. 2d 882 (5th Cir. 1970) (petition by federal prisoner
for an order directing prison administration to permit formation of a black culture organi-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 11

Hofstra Law -Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

Gaining popularity in the past couple of years is the filing of
a civil rights action in combination with a habeas corpus petition.
New York has been adamant in arguing the need for the exhaustion of state remedies and the lack of federal jurisdiction over
such proceedings. Its courts, however, have held that though a
habeas corpus petition alone requires exhaustion, when it is used
in combined form with a civil rights action and relied upon for
federal jurisdiction, failure to exhaust state remedies is not a bar
to seeking federal review of alleged unconstitutional prison practices.-" The Second Circuit, in Rodriguez v. McGinnis,5" failed to
understand ". . . how a state prisoner [complaining of the manner of custody] who is entitled to relief by habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 can opt out of the section, with its attendant
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies when these are available, simply by styling his petition as one under the Civil Rights
Act." ' " Noting that under the broad scope given habeas corpus,
prisoners can use habeas corpus petitions to attack the length or
condition of their confinement, the court concluded that all such
complaints were really petitions for habeas corpus and under the
guise of the Civil Rights Act, prisoners should not be able to
circumvent the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b). Under the
authority of Wilwording v. Swenson,6 ' however, the court was
"constrained" to hold that they could.
In Wilwording, the Supreme Court declared that the complaint, challenging the living conditions and disciplinary measures at Missouri State Penitentiary, although cognizable in federal habeas corpus, also stated a cause of action under § 1983, to
which the exhaustion requirements were not applicable. The
Supreme Court of the United States faced this issue again when
it granted certiorari in the Rodriguez case.62 The arguments advanced before the Supreme Court on behalf of New York State
zation); O'Brien v. Blackwell, 421 F. 2d 844 (5th Cir. 1970) (petition for a writ of mandamus to require prison officers to place in the mail prisoner's letters to a minister not on
the prison approved mailing list); Hess v. Blackwell, 409 F. 2d 362 (5th Cir. 1969) (motion
for restraining order to prohibit use of x-ray machines as creating danger of over-exposure
to radiation).
58. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. N.Y. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.
Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y. 1970).
59. 456 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, sub nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
60. Id. at 81.

61. 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
62. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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were that challenges to custody or conditions of custody are really
petitions for habeas corpus and thus subject to the exhaustion
requirements when seeking release or amelioration, and extensions of § 1983 to include equitable relief to state prisoners were
inappropriate, especially where adequate state procedures exist
and therefore the only way prisoners could get into federal court
is by way of habeas corpus. New York insisted that prisoners
could not use § 1983 to enjoin state prison practices and acknowledged that there is no injunctive aspect to habeas corpus. New
York asserted that an injunction could be obtained in state court.
On behalf of the original petitioners, it was argued that under
the authority of Wilwording a litigant does have a choice of two
different actions, the difference between them being that § 1983
could not be used to obtain release or to challenge a conviction
or sentence.
The Supreme Court did, however, avoid reaching this issue
by a narrow holding that in a suit praying for the restoration of
forfeited good time credit, where restoration of these credits
would result in his immediate release, an inmate is in effect seeking release from custody, and therefore, on the facts of this case
the action could be maintained only as a habeas corpus proceeding subject to the exhaustion requirement. In this opinion the
Court sought to clearly delineate challenges to the very fact or
duration of the confinement itself from constitutional challenges
to the conditions of confinement. While concluding that a suit to
restore forfeited good time credit constitutes a challenge to the
length of confinement and thus ". . . is just as close to the core
63
of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction...,,
the Court also reaffirmed that ". . . a § 1983 action is a proper
remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison . . ."" and may be sought
without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.
Before leaving Rodriguez, it should be noted that in order to
reach its holding the court had to re-examine the reasons for the
exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus actions. To an
argument by respondents that the purpose for the exhaustion
requirement was to give state courts an initial opportunity to
correct constitutional errors made by the courts themselves and
that therefore the requirement was inapplicable in this case, the
63. Id. at 489.
64. Id. at 499.
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Court replied that the comity considerations which underly the
exhaustion requirement ".

.

. [have] as much relevance in areas

of particular state administrative concern as [they do] where
state judicial action is being attacked. . . ."I' The Court found
it ". . . difficult to imagine an activity . . . that is more intri-

cately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures than
the administration of its prisons."66 However, this view of comity,
as the dissent points out, should lead to a conclusion that exhaustion should be required before an attack on prison conditions
could be commenced in federal court.
The next section of the paper should serve to make clear, as
indeed the Rodriguez Court's reliance on Younger v. Harris revealed, that the foregoing is an established reason for invoking
not the doctrine of exhaustion but the doctrine of abstention.
Other portions of the opinion, discussed later, indicate that it will
serve to further exacerbate federal-state court relations, rather
67
than ameliorate them.

III. THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTENTION

One problem that may, on occasion, still have to be confronted in a § 1983 suit is judicial sensitivity to the problems
created by the intervention of a federal court into matters involving internal prison discipline and administration. Abstention is,
simply, a decision by a federal court not to decide a case properly
65. Id. at 491.
66. Id. at 491-92.
67. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in considering alternative procedures to be followed in civil rights actions which would avoid the unnecessary use of the federal judiciary, suggested:

One-Create a statutory procedure for federal prisons to provide for hearing
prisoner complaints administratively within the prison and require that these
procedures be exhausted before any proceeding can be filed in federal courts. I
believe many states would follow the federal example.
Second-Establish informal grievance procedures-by state authority-to hear
prisoner complaints as many enlightened prison administrators, including federal prisons, have done. As the ABA Commission dealing with correctional
problems continues its very important work, I commend the subject of prisoner
grievances to that Commission's attention.
A third possiblq course:
Federal judges, acting within their existing authority, might well consider referring habeas corpus and civil rights cases brought by prisoners for preliminary
consideration to a United States Magistrate sitting as a Special Master and
reporting to the court.
Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
delivered before the American Bar Ass'n, Washington, D.C., August 6, 1973, printed in
94 S.Ct. (1973).
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within its jurisdiction." The doctrine is usually invoked for reasons of maintaining workable federal-state relations and the
economy of efforts. The doctrine is generally applicable in three
types of cases:
(1) Under the Pullman doctrine, federal courts abstain
from passing on a constitutional issue in a case which also involves a question of state law which of itself might be dispositive
of the litigation;6 9
(2) Under the Burford doctrine, federal courts abstain when
necessary to avoid needless entanglement in complex state regulatory schemes;7"
(3) Federal courts abstain where appropriate to allow state
courts, by expeditious use of available state remedies, to save a
constitutionally questionable statute.
The latter type of abstention is usually reserved for challenges to a statute on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad and therefore amenable to a construction
which eludes a finding of constitutional infirmity. Thus, where a
statute or regulation must either stand or fall on its face, abstention to allow it to be saved is not appropriate.7
Abstention seemed more appropriate prior to the Supreme
2
Court's decision in Robinson v. California1
when the eighth
amendment was not yet applicable to the states, and before the
decision in Monroe v. Pape73 and McNeese v. Board of
Education,74 when it was still believed that there existed a need
to utilize state remedies in the first place. Yet some courts remain
reluctant to interfere with what they deem to be the function of
the executive branch of government, especially in cases involving
matters exclusively of internal prison administration and within
the wide discretion of prison administrators. Thus, it is said that
the doctrine operates properly to prevent judicial review of those
deprivations which reasonably and necessarily accompany incar75
ceration.
68. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
69. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
70. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
71. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F.
Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
72. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
73. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
74. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
75. Burns v. Swenson, 288 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Mo. 1968), rev'd in part, modified in
part, on other grounds, 430 F. 2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
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The difference between the exhaustion and abstention doctrines has been said to be that exhaustion of state remedies, as a
prerequisite to a federal court's consideration of the merits of a
case, is a jurisdictional or pseudo-jurisdictional requirement,
while the abstention doctrine assumes that the court has jurisdiction."8 Abstention does not involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction but only the postponement of its exercise. Where the doctrine is invoked, the proper course is for federal courts to retain
jurisdiction, rather than to dismiss, pending proceedings in the
state court.77
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Monroe
v. Pape,T8 McNeese v. Board of Education,"7 Dombrowski v.
Pfister,8 0 Zwickler v. Koota,81 and Damico v. California8 should
have dispelled any doubts concerning the inapplicability of abstention to civil rights cases. In Zwickler, the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction to determine the question of the scope
of discretion of federal courts to abstain from deciding a civil
rights claim on its merits. The Court held that in expanding the
power of the federal judiciary by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
28 U.S.C. § 1343, Congress imposed upon federal courts the duty
to give due respect to a litigant's choice of a federal forum for a
hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claim.
Still, several courts have persisted in availing themselves of
the doctrine, proclaiming it applicable except in cases of extreme
maltreatment, 3 or where paramount constitutional rights are
involved.84 In Argentine v. McGinnis,85 allegations of inadequate
medical care, harassment, and demotion to a lower paying job,
as a result of petitioner's complaints of deprivations of civil
rights, the confiscation of petitioner's drinking cup, clothing, and
76. Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F. 2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
77. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, New Jersey Branch v. N.J. Supreme Court, 409
U.S. 467 (1973).
78. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
79. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
80. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
82. 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
83. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F. 2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F. 2d
526 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497
(S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439 F. 2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971); Argentine v. McGinnis, 311 F. Supp.
134 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Jones v. Peyton, 294 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Va. 1968).
84. E.g., Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439 F. 2d 146 (5th
Cir. 1971).
85. 311 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
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other personal items, and the regulation of his mail were all considered matters of internal prison administration and did not
present the sort of extreme case which would justify a court's
inquiry into matters of prison administration. Similarly, the rules
and regulations regarding the maintenance of prison discipline
and security have been considered executive functions with which
the federal courts are loathe to interfere. 86 '
In New York, on the other hand, federal courts, while pleading for the exercise of a little abstention in appropriate cases,
have been finding the doctrine inapplicable to the case before
them or else have felt obliged to resist employing it in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Monroe, McNeese, Dombrowski, Zwickler, and Damico, and an accompanying trend toward less abstention. In Carothers v. Follette,8" a federal district
court warned that courts should proceed cautiously when asked
to enjoin or reverse state prison practices and favor abstention,
especially if the state has a system of administrative review available. In this instance, however, the court observed that no system
was in effect. In Kritsky v. McGinnis,8 8 Chief Judge Foley took
the opportunity to reaffirm the opinion he had expressed in
Rodriguez v. McGinnis,9 that ". . . it may be that the doctrine
of temporary abstention should be applied to veer these challenges into the State Courts where I think they belong. However
. . .the trend seems to the contrary."90
Amidst wide acceptance of the view that it is not the function
of the judiciary to run prisons or to undertake the supervision of
day to day treatment or discipline of inmates,91 one federal court
declared that federal courts must distinguish between mere disciplinary matters and arbitrary and capricious disregard of prisoners' rights.2 Where prison authorities have so greatly impaired
the constitutional rights of inmates so as to give rise to a cause
of action under the Civil Rights Act, complete deference in deter86. Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aft'd, 445 F. 2d 801 (5th Cir.
1971); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd 435 F. 2d 1255 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
87. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
88. 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y. 1970).
89. 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. N.Y. 1969), afl'd, 456 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
90. Id. at 630.
91. Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F. 2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971).
92. United States ex rel. Wakely v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7,
12 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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mining necessary and appropriate prison practices should no
longer be given to prison administrators. 3
For the most part the doctrine of abstention should no longer
pose any major obstacles to § 1983 suits. The doctrine itself is one
which is to be applied only in narrowly limited, special circumstances. Cases involving vital issues of civil rights are the least
likely candidates for application of abstention. 4 When fundamental constitutional rights are involved, the state's interest in

the internal operation of its penal institution is inferior to the
preservation of those federally protected rights. The doctrine of
abstention, which is to be used only in exceptional circumstances,
does not permit the federal courts to defer to state courts for
decision on a federal constitutional question. 5
Federal courts have refised to abstain from deciding cases
involving challenges to maximum security procedures and conditions,9 the adequacy of essential medical care,9" the denial of nonsubversive newspapers, 8 placement in solitary confinement, 9
obstruction to the adherence or exercise of religious beliefs,' 0
prison disciplinary procedures,' 0' and interference with a prisoner's right of access to the courts.0 2 Even the availability of a
state remedy has not deterred courts from passing on a suitor's
claim in a civil rights action.' 3 And, though still adhering to the
belief that abstention in appropriate cases would be in the best
interests of justice, one federal court, considering that ". . . the

harshest blow to the old 'hands-off doctrine was struck by
93. Ross v. Blackledge, 477 F. 2d 616 (4th Cir. 1973); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F. 2d 618
(7th Cir. 1967).
94. Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F. 2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F.
Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F. 2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
95. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F. 2d 1299 (5th
Cir. 1970); Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 398 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Wright v.
McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Pierce
v. LaVallee, 293 F. 2d 233 (2d Cir. 1967); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F. 2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966);
Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F. 2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
96. Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
97. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F. 2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp.
124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
98. Rivers v. Royster, 360 F. 2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).
99. Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F. 2d 233 (2d Cir. 1967).
100. Id.; Cooper v. Pate, 382 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1961).
101. Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
102. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F. 2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
103. Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F. 2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F. 2d
592 (4th Cir. 1966).
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Monroe v. Pape," acknowledged that "... it is now settled beyond question that claims of this kind alleging federal constitutional deprivation by State prisoners, if not frivolous on their
federal courts . . . and
face, are within the jurisdiction of the
10 4
determined.
and
must be entertained
An examination of the doctrine of abstention should include
some mention of the Supreme Court's fairly recent decision in
Younger v. Harris,05 which held that federal courts should not
enjoin a state prosecution in the absence of harassment or the
threat of great and immediate harm as to do so would violate "the
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending
state court proceedings except under special circumstances." ' "6
Its stated policy was ". . . to permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal courts."'0 7
Though Younger severely limited the circumstances in which
federal courts should intervene in pending state criminal prosecutions, it expressed ". . . no view about the circumstances under
which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pend' 08
ing in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun."'
In Younger the Court observed that even federal intervention in
civil cases was not limited by the same restrictions applicable in
criminal prosecutions because "[t]he offense to state interests is
likely to be less in a civil proceeding."'' Certainly the offense to
state interests would be even less if no proceedings at all were
pending in state courts.
Accordingly, the principles of Younger should not be viewed
as requiring abstention in a prisoners' rights suit begun when
criminal proceedings in state court have already terminated. Further, the federal anti-injunction statute applicable in Younger ' ,'
has been held not applicable to suits brought under § 1983."' It
does not appear that federal courts have relied on Younger to
104. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 628 (N.D. N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 456 F.
2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, sub nom., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
105. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
106. Id. at 41.
107. Id. at 43.
108. Id. at 41.
109. Id. at 55 n.2 (1971).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
111. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 11

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

abstain from deciding § 1983 claims. In a class action challenging
the validity of a state involuntary commitment statute a federal
court refused (over defendant's insistence) to apply the decision
in Younger so as to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in a civil
rights action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
2
enforcement of certain portions of the Wisconsin statute."1
IV.

CLASS ACTIONS

Section 1983 suits are attractive due to the relative ease with
which class actions can be maintained, assuming the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 can be met."13 Usually a suit challenging general prison conditions or practices will meet those requirements and the class will usually be too numerous for joinder.
The maintainability of a class action has several crucial advantages. It eases court congestion by reducing the number of
individual petitions and the risk of inconsistent adjudication with
respect to plaintiffs in similar situations raising identical claims.
It eliminates the need to appoint counsel for individual petitioners and insures a hearing for prisoners whose claims might otherwise have gone unconsidered. It is especially useful when members of the class are poor or there is no time to identify and
contact all members of the purported class."' A class action provides the basis for the granting of broad equitable relief going
beyond the situation of a particular plaintiff. It can thus serve to
reimburse for deprivations of constitutional rights where individual damages are too small to warrant redress and to provide relief
where it is difficult to make a case for specific individual relief.
In Holt v. Sarver, though awarding broad declaratory relief to
inmates confined in the Arkansas state prison system, the court
noted:"'
As far as the individual claims of the individual Petitioners are
112. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also, Conover v.
Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073 (3rd Cir. 1973).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 requires for the maintenance of a class action: (1) numerosity
(23 (a)(1)), (2) common questions of law or fact (23 (a)(2)), (3) typicality of claims (23
(a)(3)), (4) representative ability of named plaintiffs (23 (a) (4)). In addition, one of the
following: risk of inconsistent adjudication (23 (b) (1) (A) (B)); action or refusal to act on
the part of party opposing the class in a manner generally applicable to the class (23 (b)
(2)); questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting individual members and
class action is superior to other available methods (23 (b) (3)).
114. All members of a class need not be identified and contacted until they succeed
on common claims.
115. 309 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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concerned, including the individual complaints of inmates now
in isolation, the Court does not consider that any of the Petitioners has made a case for specific individual relief. However, all
of the Petitioners are subject to the overall situation which renders the Penitentiary unconstitutional and all are entitled to
class relief with respect to that situation. [footnote omitted]
The class action is also vital as a means of avoiding the
problem of mootness which occurs if a particular plaintiff is released."' In Jones v. Wittenburg,"7 the court held that where it
appeared that the claims of any particular individual plaintiff
could easily become moot at any time and where it would be very
difficult to demonstrate that any particular inmate had suffered
a specific wrong which could be righted without regard to the
totality of wrongs in the jail system, an action under the Civil
Rights Act by prisoners could only be maintained as a class action. In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,"5 the court held that the
promotion of the named plaintiff in a class action alleging systematic racial discrimination does not render the suit moot as to
the individual or to the class he represents.
Class actions are widely recognized in § 1983 suits and have
generally been successful in eliminating a number of unconstitutional practices. They have brought relief from widespread brutality. A § 1983 suit, brought on behalf of 2,000 inmates was
successful in obtaining injunctive relief against real or threatened
brutality from state officials. In that case, the Second Circuit also
directed the district court, on remand, to consider ordering specific measures to implement the injunction, including the appointment of federal monitors."' Valvano v. McGrath,2 ' a class
action, brought on behalf of all persons incarcerated in the
Queens House of Detention for Men, was based on alleged deprivations of first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment
rights. The inmates were granted injunctive relief against the use
of violence, strip searches, the denial of essential medical care,
interference with mail, excessive lock-ins, unsanitary conditions,
and the withholding of bedding and toilet articles by correctional
116. Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073 (3rd Cir. 1973); Washington v. Lee, 263
F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), afl'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
117. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971) aff'd. sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F. 2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972).
118. 400 F. 2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
119. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
120. 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 11

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

officers. Inmates confined at the Arkansas State Penitentiary, in
a class action attack upon the entire penal system, received broad
equitable relief to correct prison conditions and practices including the trusty system whereby inmate trustees ran the prison, the
open barracks system, the conditions of isolation cells, and the
absence of any meaningful rehabilitation program.''
Proceeding as a class, Arkansas state prisoners won relief
from the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.
In Jackson v. Bishop,'22 the court held that the use of a strap to
whip prisoners was unconstitutional per se as violative of the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, irrespective of
any safeguards surrounding its use.
Class actions have also served as a vehicle to eliminate racial
segregation in prisons, 23 to grant relief from oppressive prison
conditions such as overcrowdedness, filth, starvation, 14 the inability to communicate privately with counsel,' 25 and to correct
prison disciplinary practices. A federal court, in Landman v.
Royster,2 6 held that due process rights must b&afforded prisoners
in disciplinary proceedings. Elaborating, the court declared that
among the procedural rights due an inmate is a right to crossexamine adverse witnesses, to present evidence on his own behalf,
to receive timely notice of the charges against him, to have a
hearing by an impartial tribunal and a decision based on the
evidence, and the right to solicit advisors to present his case if he
is intellectually unable to do so. Further, the court ordered prison
authorities to set specific standards for inmate conduct to replace
a board discretionary policy through which, until the court's decision, inmates could be penalized for "misconduct." Similar due
27
process rights for inmates were declared in Bundy v. Cannon.1
Although the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 had not been met,
the court still granted declaratory relief which would benefit all
persons similarly situated though not parties to the action. Regu121. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd 442 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
122. 404 F. 2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
123. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
124. Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); afl'd, sub nom. Jones
v. Metzger, 456 F. 2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); see Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala.
1971).
125. Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971); Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F.
Supp. 681 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
126. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
127. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
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lations governing discipline and classification procedures, negotiated by the parties to the class action in arms-length good faith
bargaining, were adopted as the interim decree of the court in
2 8
Morris v. Travisono.1
One obstacle to class actions is the difficulty of defining the
class. This problem is mainly encountered in attempts at bringing a class action on behalf of those confined in temporary detention facilities where two characteristics of the facility seem to
mitigate against the efficacy of a class action. The first is the
rapid turnover of inmates imprisoned within them. Secondly, this
type of facility restrains two different categories of inmates, each
with different rights: convicted and non-convicted.
Indeed, one federal court refused to permit inmates of a city
jail to proceed as a class where it could not be established that
the individual plaintiffs were representative of the class for whom
they would purport to act, adequate notice could not be given
reasonably to this class, and there was a great turnover of inmates
within the jail.'29 Nevertheless, several such suits have been allowed. In Royster v. McGinnis, 0 a federal court permitted a class
action to be brought on behalf of state prisoners similarly situated
who had served terms of incarceration in a city jail prior to their
transfer to state prison but had not received good time credit for
the period of pre-sentence incarceration. Another federal court, in
Valvano v. McGrath, "I held that a suit brought on behalf of
inmates confined in the Queens House of Detention for Men was
maintainable as a class action despite continuous changes in the
13 2
incomposition of the inmate population. Jones v. Wittenburg
volved a class action challenge by prisoners to conditions in a city
jail, brought on behalf of themselves and as representatives of the
class of persons who were or might be confined in the facility. The
court permitted the suit to be maintained as a class action, with
the class consisting of those who at any given point in time were
confined in the city jail. In another case, a federal court held that
it retained jurisdiction over the action even if some inmates were
transferred. 33 Moreover, the maintenance of a class action chal128. 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
129. Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Peterson, 51 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
130. 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. N.Y. 1971) rev'd. on other grounds 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
131. 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
132. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd. sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F. 2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972).
133. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
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lenging conditions and practices at a state prison has been permitted even though not all plaintiffs were, at the time the proceeding began, incarcerated within it, on the grounds that when
all plaintiffs showed past use and the expectation of future use,
all had standing to challenge existing conditions at the prison.'3 4
Class actions in habeas corpus proceedings are rarely attempted. In Hill v. Nelson, '3 the federal court, while deeming a
class action impracticable in the instant case because of procedural problems, refused to hold that a class action could never be
maintained in a proceeding on a habeas corpus petition. The
court, however, did order all executions stayed so that all members of the attempted class could file individual petitions. Transforming a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act to a petition
for habeas corpus, the court in James v. Headley'30 held that
injunctive relief would not be granted where a legal remedy was
available and therefore there was no reason to make the action a
suit for class relief. This issue was never reached in Mitchell v.
Schoonfield,,37 where the suit was dismissed f6r failure to exhaust
state remedies, but the court observed that it is not at all clear
whether a habeas corpus proceeding could be entertained as a
class action. The class action issue was also not decided in Mead
v. Parker.38 The Ninth Circuit did, however, remand the case to
the district court for a hearing to determine the propriety of permitting the petitioners to bring a habeas corpus class action.
The issue, however, was reached and resolved by federal
courts in proceedings to determine the propriety of maintaining
a habeas corpus proceeding as a joint or class action. One court
held that a habeas corpus proceeding attacking the death penalty
and practice in capital cases could not be maintained as a joint
action where there was in excess of fifty prisoners in the class
sought to be represented, and the size of the class was unstable
and subject to constant fluctuation. However, the proceeding
could be maintained as a class action where it presented questions of law or fact common to the class and where the claims of
the individuals were typical of the claims of the class. Viewing the
Hill decision as reached solely on the basis of practicability, the
134. Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971). See also Conover v. Montemuro,
477 F. 2d. 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
135. 272 F. Supp. 790, 794 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
136. 410 F. 2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
137. 285 F. Supp. 728 (D. Md. 1968).
138. 464 F. 2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972).
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court held that Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 is applicable in habeas corpus
proceedings. 39 Whether this case survives the Supreme Court
decision in Harrisv. Nelson' is questionable. While habeas corpus is generally considered a civil action, in Harris the Court
implicitly ruled that the Fed.R.Civ.P. are not automatically
applicable in habeas corpus proceedings by virtue of Fed.R.
Civ.P. 81(a)(2), by holding that the application of Rule 33 (interrogatories for discovery purposes) is excluded in habeas corpus
proceedings.
intimates no view with
However, the Supreme Court "...
respect to class actions."''
Another federal court, in an action challenging conditions at
the United States Medical Center, held that
under certain circumstances a class action provides an appropriate procedure to resolve the claims of a group of petitioners and
avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial effects in considering
multiple petitions, holding multiple hearings, and writing multiple opinions.'
Other courts which have dealt with the issue have not presented
a single compelling reason why class actions ought not to be permitted in habeas corpus proceedings. The reasons which are offered include the following: a commitment to prison acts individually on each person committed and a writ seeking discharge
from confinement must likewise be individual."' No one can have
an interest in the illegal restraint of another. 44' "The very nature
of habeas corpus forfends class actions."'' 5 Ordinarily, class actions are permitted in equitable actions only."'
' 7
However, the Mead Court took note of these reasons: 1
Certainly the usual habeas corpus case relates only to the individual petitioner and to his unique problem. But there can be
cases, and this is one of them, where the relief sought can be of
139. Adderley v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D. Fla. 1968). See also Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (permitting joinder of parties and consolidation of cases when
common question of law or fact are involved).
140. 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
141. 394 U.S. 286, 295 n.5 (1969).
142. Williams v. Richardson, 481 F. 2d 358 (8th Cir. 1973).
143. Ferree v. Douglas, 145 Pa. Super. 447, 21 A. 2d 472 (1941).
144. Petition of Santiago, 104 N.J. Super. 110, 248 A. 2d 701, 704 (1968), aff'd, 107
N.J. Super. 243, 258 A. 2d 31 (1969); In re Kosopud, 272 F. 330 (N.D. Ohio 1920).
145. Riley v. City & County of Denver, 137 Colo. 312, 324 P. 2d 790, 791 (1955).
146. State ex rel. Williams v. Purdy, 242 So. 2d 498 (Fla. App. 1971).
147. 464 F. 2d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1972).
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immediate benefit to a large and amorphous group. In such
cases . . . a class action may be appropriate.
The unique status of Royster v. McGinnis' should also be
considered. Royster began as a § 1983 class action challenging on
equal protection grounds a New York statute which denied to
certain state prisoners good-time credit for parole eligibility for
the period of their pre-sentence incarceration in the county jail.
The litigation proceeded to the United States Supreme Court
which made a dispositive ruling against the inmates on the
merits. According to Preiserv. Rodriguez,' this case could only
have been brought on a petition for habeas corpus. There appears
to be no evident reason why the action could not have proceeded
as a class had the form of the suit been a habeas corpus proceeding.
Whether proceeding under the Civil Rights Act or by way of
a petition for habeas corpus, the relief requested need not be
expensive, as in Jackson, supra. However, proceeding by means
of a class action may tend to overemphasize the scope of the
abuse and sometimes require relief requiring the expenditure of
exorbitant sums. Recognizing that such expenditures would be
necessary to bring the Arkansas state penitentiary system up to
constitutional standards, the court in Holt v. Sarver,""refused to
grant injunctive relief or to order that all constitutional infirmities be corrected immediately. It did say, however:"'
If there are things that Respondents can do now with available
personnel, they will be expected to do them now. If necessary
steps cost money, and they will, Respondents must move as
rapidly as funds become available.
While acknowledging the obligation of prison authorities to eliminate unconstitutional conditions in the penal institutions, the
courts also recognize the financial handicaps under which most
are obliged to operate. At a time when prison budgets are inadequate and when state revenue is limited, it is doubtful whether
courts will continue to grant such broad and costly relief.
V.

REMEDIES

Relief in a prisoners' rights suit generally calls for the exerof
cise the federal courts' broad equitable powers. Redress in such
148.
149.
150.
151.

332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), rev'd. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd. 442 F. 2d 304 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 385.
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litigation usually takes the form of damages, injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, or release from custody. The decision to proceed under the Civil Rights Act or the federal habeas corpus
statute will in part depend on the type of relief desired.
A.

§ 1983:

Broad equitable relief is obtainable in a § 1983 suit.
1. Damages
Money damages can be awarded to prisoners for violations of
their constitutional rights by prison officials. A claim for damages
can be useful in preventing recurrence of the objectionable conduct and to avoid the problems of mootness created when remedial action is taken by a defendant subsequent to the filing of a
claim seeking only individual injunctive relief. In Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp.,'5 2 a class action by black employees alleging
systematic racial discrimination, the promotion of the named
plaintiff did not moot the proceeding even as to him, because of
his claim for back pay differential.
Section 1983 is well-suited to compensate individuals for
15 3
damages arising from the unconstitutional acts of state officers.
In Roberts v. Williams,'5 a minor severely injured at a county
farm was awarded $85,000 against the trustee at the farm and the
county farm superintendant who entrusted the inmate trustee
with firearms. The petitioner, convicted of petty larceny for the
theft of articles with a retail value of two dollars and eleven cents,
was blinded and suffered possible brain damage upon being shot
by an inmate trustee who had been convicted of assault and
battery with intent to kill. The actions of the inattentive and
careless administrator who gave the trustee guns without even
instructing him on their use was held not to meet the standard
152. 400 F. 2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); accord, Rhodes v. Bureau of Prisons, 477 F. 2d 347
(5th Cir. 1973); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Washington v.
Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
153. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 473 (1973); Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F. 2d 835 (5th
Cir. 1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Kisk v. County of Milwaukee,
441 F. 2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F. 2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969); Whirl v.
Kern, 407 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967);
DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F. 2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966); Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F. 2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964);
Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F.
Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967).
154. 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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of care required and therefore concurrent tortious conduct was
found.
The injury sustained need not be physically severe in order
to claim damages. In Sigafus v. Brown,'55 a complaint charging
that legal papers essential to petitioner's post-conviction hearing
had been confiscated and destroyed and seeking $25,000 in damages caused by the loss of such papers, was held to state a cause
of action under the Civil Rights Act.
Unlike a suit for injunctive relief, a claim for damages remains viable even though the petitioner is no longer in a position
to be subjected to the complained of abuses. Though not requesting money damages, one plaintiff was held entitled to recover
them in Richey v. Wilkins, wherein the court announced: 5 '
It is beyond question that a plaintiff suing under the Civil
Rights Act may seek money damages as well as injunctive relief
and a right to such damages of course cannot be conditioned
upon the plaintiff's being, at the time he brings suit, in a situation where he is subject to further invasion of his rights.
The basis for recovery of ordinary tort damages was laid by
the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape.'-" The Fourth Circuit
Court, in Jenkins v. Averett, 5 8 held that the grossly culpable negligence of a state police officer in shooting an eighteen year old
black youth was a constitutional violation within the purview of
the Civil Rights Act and that an award limited to out-of-pocket
expenses would be inadequate. While leaving open the question
of whether punitive damages were appropriate in the instant
case, the court further held that the pain and suffering accompanying the personal injury should be compensated.
Recovery for pain and suffering and mental anguish have on
several occasions accompanied the recovery of tort damages. In
an action under the Civil Rights Act based on a charge of false
imprisonment, a federal court permitted recovery for both physi0 the federal
cal and mental anguish.' In Rhoads v. Horvat,11
court left it to the jury to determine the amount, apart from
specific monetary damages, that the plaintiff was entitled to be
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

416 F. 2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969).
335 F. 2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1964).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
424 F. 2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968).
270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
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awarded for the deprivation of civil rights, including his subjective pain, suffering, and humiliation. In Rhoads, the deprivation
claimed by the plaintiff was that of being arrested without a
warrant and being held for thirty to forty minutes.
Evidence establishing the use of greater force than necessary
by city police officers in placing the plaintiffs under arrest, the
refusal to permit them, once in jail, to call an attorney or friend,
and the conducting of an illegal exploratory search of their trucks
was held to justify an award of $5100 total damages for violations
of plaintiffs' civil rights. Each plaintiff had sustained approximately $1800 in out-of-pocket expenses, in addition to $1600 loss
of wages, as well as mental suffering, humiliation, and injury to
personal reputation in MacArthur v. Pennington.6 '
Compensatory damages of $25 per day for every day spent in
segregation were awarded by a federal court to prisoners who had
been placed in solitary confinement due to their political beliefs.
On appeal the punitive damages were held not recoverable but
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did affirm the award of
compensatory damages." 2
An award of punitive damages is made to a plaintiff, based
on the wilfullness or wantonness of the defendant's act and its
purpose is punishment, rather than compensation. Such an
award must bear a relationship to the extent of culpability of the
defendant's acts. 6 3
The Second Circuit's decision in Sostre v. McGinnis,'6 4 while
not permitting the recovery of punitive damages on the grounds
that the improper conduct of the warden did not reflect a general
pattern of behavior and that therefore its deterrent effect would
be minimal, rievertheless recognized that in appropriate cases,
punitive damages could be recovered in civil rights actions. On
many occasions, where the conduct was sufficiently outrageous
and the defendant acted on an improper motive, punitive damages have been recovered in civil rights suits." 5 Conduct viewed
161. 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); accord, Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F. 2d 983 (7th
Cir. 1973).
162. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part,modified
in part, aff'd in part, sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
163. Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
164. 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.
N.J. 1971).
165. Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F. 2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967); Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74
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by the court as justifying an award of punitive damages has included the removal of an inmate from a county jail to a state
prison for purposes of preventing him from conferring with counsel and preparing a defense for his upcoming murder trial in
addition to forcing him to plead guilty;' 66 an unlawful arrest,
detention, prosecution, and physical attack by a magistrate's
constable;' 7 and a series of house searches conducted without
warrants or probable cause.' 6 8 Even where no actual damages are
shown, punitive damages can be recovered.' 0
Nominal damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of civil rights and are proved, as a matter of federal common
law, by proof of the deprivation.7 0 Federal courts have recognized
that a wrong under the Civil Rights Act may consist solely of the
deprivation of constitutional rights and have held that nominal
damages may be recovered where no actual damages were sustained. 7 ' In Whirl v. Kern, 72 in which damages were sought for
false imprisonment, the court observed that in some cases a
man's freedom is worth only nominal damages, but regardless of
his indigency a man's freedom is not valueless and, therefore, the
courts will grant damages to any man for false imprisonment.
However, in deciding to commence litigation of a damage
claim it should be realized that a judicial grant of monetary relief
might be an empty award. The usual defendants in prisoners'
rights suits, are rarely, if ever, in a financial position to discharge
their indebtedness if any large sum of money is awarded. Even
small sums, though, may be of great importance to a prisoner.
However, the real culprit behind the oppressive prison conditions,
the State, is immune from liability.
2. Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief can be granted in a civil rights action to the
(3d Cir. 1965) Davis v. Board of Trustees, 270 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd. 396 F.
2d 730 (8th Cir. 1968); Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. S.C. 1965).
166. Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F. 2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
167. Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. S.C. 1965).
168. Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
169. Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
170. Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
171. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968); Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1965); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F. 2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F.
Supp. 572 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
172. 407 F. 2d 781, 798 (5th Cir. 1968).
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extent that petitioners show they are entitled to it. However, the
applicant has the burden of convincing the court that such relief
73
is necessary.
The mere cessation of the illegal conduct is not sufficient to
justify the denial of injunctive relief where ". . . there exists
some cognizable danger of recurrent violation.' 7 4 Thus, the Second Circuit Court granted preliminary injunctive relief while acknowledging that the major wave of reprisals against inmates by
guards for a prison uprising had most likely terminated because
similar misconduct and harrassment had continued over an extended period of time. 175 Similarly, the transfer of an inmate, who
challenged the validity of a state statute under which he was
removed from prison to a mental hospital, back to the state
prison, did not render the suit moot where the inmate was still
subject to the state's continuing policy of commitments to mental
hospitals. 6 The transfer to another prison does not render an77
action for injunctive relief moot due to the possibility of return.
75
a federal court enjoined a police comIn Lankford v. Gelston,1
missioner from conducting any further searches based on uncorroborated, anonymous tips and, therefore, without probable cause
even though the commissioner had already ordered the cessation
of such conduct, because the court believed that the practice of
indiscriminate searches had been renounced only "obliquely"
and the danger of repetition had not been removed. The issuance
of an injunction against conducting searches without a warrant,
however, was not deemed necessary. Moreover, because the administration of a state prison was not in complete control of subordinates and it was shown that in the past prison guards had
acted on their own, injunctive relief was granted, in Landman v.
Royster, I7in spite of the fact that new regulations had been formulated to correct constitutional infirmities.
Nevertheless, ". . . there are situations where an enforce173. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25 (1970); United States v. W.T. Grant
Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
174. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); Lankford v. Gelston,
364 F. 2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); See, Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller,
453 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F. 2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F. 2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
175. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
176. Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F. 2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
177. Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F. 2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964).
178. 364 F. 2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
179. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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ment proceeding will become moot because a party can establish
that 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated.' ",0 No recurrence of the misconduct could be expected
where, after police had failed on one occasion to protect anti-war
demonstrators from assaults, the success of correctional procedures initiated by the mayor and police commissioner was shown
by police handling of two subsequent demonstrations." ' Even
where the court held that the conditions under which inmates
were confined amounted to cruel and unusual punishment (denuded for substantial periods of time, deprived of basic elements
of hygiene, i.e. soap and toilet paper) which the court felt were
"subhuman" and which operated to "undermine sanity", it denied injunctive relief due to the absence of any indication that
such practices would continue in the future.'8 - In another case,
the state's adoption of adequate rules governing disciplinary procedures warranted the denial of injunctive relief though individ83
ual relief was granted.'
Where the burden of proving the danger of recurrence can be
met, applications for injunctive relief can be very successful in
obtaining relief from unconstitutional prison practices.
Injunctive relief has been granted to eliminate widespread
brutality in prisons,' to invalidate prison regulations restricting
inmates' access to legal assistance, 8 5 to prevent interference with
attorney-client communications, 86 to prohibit the unlawful housing of inmates in accordance with a discriminatory policy in a
federal reformatory, 7 to suspend disciplinary proceedings until
they meet constitutional requirements,'8 8 to remove obstructions
to the exercise of religious beliefs,'89 and to eliminate corporal
punishment.'90 But, where the entire penal system is in violation
180. N.L.R.B. v. Raytheon, 398 U.S. 25, 27 (1970), quoting from, United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
181. Belknap v. Leary, 427 F. 2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970).
182. Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afl'd, 435 F. 2d 1255 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
183. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
184. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971); Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
185. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
186. Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971); Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F.
Supp. 681 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
187. Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Va. 1963).
188. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
189. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
190. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
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of the Federal Constitution, and the costs of an overhaul would
in
be great, injunctive relief is not appropriate. 9 ' Prison officials
92
violation of a prior injunction can be fined for contempt.
There is one serious drawback to the utility of injunctive
relief. The responsibility for unconstitutional prison practices
and conditions does not rest solely on prison administrators. The
eleventh amendment forbids the issuance of an injunction against
a state government.'93 Yet, it is the state government which holds
the purse strings and controls the money sorely needed for prison
reform.
3. DeclaratoryJudgments
Regardless of what other relief a plaintiff may be entitled to,
all federal courts are empowered to issue a declaratory judgment
designating the legal rights and relations of the interested parties.'5 ' In the context of prisoners' rights litigation, declaratory
relief is most often granted when the deprivation alleged pertains
to one of the following prison policies: (1) inadequate disciplinary
procedures, (2) racial discrimination and segregation and (3) general prison conditions and practices.
A declaratory judgment to the effect that the disciplinary
procedures employed at San Quentin were in violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment was issued in Clutchette v. Procunier.55 The court there
found that prison authorities by failing to provide for adequate
notice of the charges involved, by the calling of favorable witnesses and the cross-examination of accusatory witnesses, counsel
or counsel-substitute, a decision by an objective factfinder, a
191. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd. 442 F. 2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
192. But see, Hamilton v. Love, 358 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 provides:
In the case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect
to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
195. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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written statement of the findings of fact, or uniform notice of any
right to appeal the decision, when such procedures could result
in grievous loss to the inmate concerned, deprived the inmate of
constitutionally protected rights. The court further declared that
disciplinary punishment, including but not limited to (1) indefinite confinement in the adjustment center, or segregation, (2)
possible increase in sentence due to referral of disciplinary action
to the Adult Authority, (3) fine or forfeiture of accumulated or
future earnings, (4) confinement in isolation longer than ten days
and (5) referral to the District Attorney for criminal prosecution,
constituted such a grievous loss.' 6
To the extent that a state statute required the segregation of
the races in the state penal system, such statute was declared
violative of the fourteenth amendment in Washington v. Lee.'"
Racial discrimination, including segregation, was also declared
unconstitutional in Holt v. Sarver.18 In Holt, the court gave additional declaratory relief as to the overall conditions in the Arkansas Penitentiary System, declaring that the cumulative effect of
four grievances, (the trusty system, the open barracks system, the
conditions in the isolation cells, and the absence of a meaningful
rehabilitation program) was that confinement in the penitentiary
system amounted to a cruel and unusual punishment which was
prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Mainly because of financial considerations, the court, however, did not grant injunctive relief to enforce its judgment. In
view of the history of the case this seems unfortunate. Holt was
actually eight cases consolidated for trial. Three of these cases
had previously been consolidated for an earlier trial. The case,
called Holt 1,111 was never actually terminated. The court there
had found that the overcrowded conditions in isolation cells was
unconstitutional and that the state had failed in its constitutional
duty to use ordinary care in providing for the safety of inmates.
Some improvements in prison conditions followed the court's decree. However, shortly thereafter, limited funds caused a retro196. Id. at 785; see Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
197. 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
198. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also
Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Va. 1963), which held that integration of all
white dormitories while blacks could choose to live in an all black dormitory established
unlawful discrimination when not required for health, security, or other penal reasons.
Prison can integrate if without regard to color or creed.
199. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
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gression to former conditions prompting the court to withhold
approval of the report filed by the Commissioner in Holt I and to
further consider the overall conditions in the institutions. It appears that in the absence of an injunction to enforce it, a declaratory judgment alone might bring only slight and short-lived relief,
perhaps another instance of too little, too late.
4.

FurtherRelief

In addition to the forms of relief already discussed, federal
courts are authorized to grant any further relief found necessary.2 "' Aside from enjoining oppressive prison conditions or declaring them unconstitutional with the goal being their elimination, federal courts have sufficient equitable power to direct affirmative changes in the prison system. It is appropriate for a
court upon finding an unconstitutional practice in a penal system, to require officials to develop and propose for approval by
the court new plans of operation in conformance with guidelines
as set by the federal courts, as well as regular reports to the court
describing the progress made in rectifying constitutional deficiencies. It is usual in this situation for the court to retain jurisdiction
over the case. 21' Such orders have been issued regarding disciplinary procedures, 2 2 legal assistance,2 3 religious exercise,2 4 racial
2
segregation,2 5 prisoners' mail, 26 and general prison conditions. 1
It is usual for a court to require that approved copies of new
rules be furnished to all inmates. In Morris v. Travisono,25 the
court also ordered that each inmate affected by the rules governing the disciplinary and classification procedures be allowed to
send to the judge, in writing, their uncensored comments, objections, or approval of the new procedures.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 provides:
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party
whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
201. E.g., Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
202. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); see Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
203. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
204. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F. 2d 518
(7th Cir. 1967).
205. Crum v. State Training School for Girls, 413 F. 2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1969); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
206. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
207. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afl'd, 442 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
208. 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
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Federal courts have also appointed monitors to enforce their
decrees and to investigate the complaints of inmates."' In addition these courts have the power to order the expungement of
prisoners' records. t 0 Courts have the authority and obligation to
fashion affirmative relief so as to provide an effectual federal
remedy where the Civil Rights Act is violated."'
5.

Release

Probably the most significant remaining difference between
habeas corpus and § 1983 is that the Civil Rights Act may not
be invoked by a state prisoner to gain release from custody.21 In
Johnson v. Walker,2 3 an action brought under §1983 was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies because the complaint prayed for relief in the form of release from custody. While
§ 1983 and habeas corpus were merging as vehicles for prisoners'
214
rights litigation, a distinction was advanced, both judicially
and on oral argument before the Supreme Court in Preiser v.
Rodriguez,2 15 for the presence of the exhaustion requirement in
habeas corpus and its absence in the Civil Rights Act. The distinction is that if a prisoner is not seeking redress for alleged civil
rights violations incurred in his state criminal proceeding and he
does not seek release from custody, § 1983 may be properly invoked without first exhausting state remedies. If the challenge is
to the validity of the origin conviction and the fact of
confinement, the proper remedy is habeas corpus. Due to concern
over the circumvention of the exhaustion requirement by prisoners using the Civil Rights Act as an alternative to habeas corpus,
release from custody is not available as a remedy under § 1983.
209. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971); Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
210. U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
211. Johnson v. Capitol City Lodge No. 74, Fraternal Order of Police, 477 F. 2d 601
(4th Cir. 1973).
212. Smartt v. Avery, 411 F. 2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969); Peinado v. Adult Authority of
Dept. of Corrections, 405 F. 2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969);
DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F. 2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Walker 317 F. 2d 418 (5th Cir.
1963); Smith v. Logan, 311 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Va. 1970).
213. 317 F. 2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963).
214. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Smartt v. Avery, 411 F. 2d 408
(6th Cir. 1969); Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. N.Y. 1971) rev'd on other
grounds, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Johnson v. Walker, 317 F. 2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963); Krst v.
Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970), affd, 439 F. 2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
215. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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B.

Habeas Corpus

As the scope of habeas corpus expanded, remedies other than
release had to be made available in order for habeas corpus to be
an appropriate means of challenging prison conditions. Habeas is
suitable for challenging the manner of one's custody only because
21
it may now be used even when release is not the remedy sought. 1
As early as 1941 the Supreme Court, noting that a court is not
required to compel release, merely invalidated a prison regulation
which impaired the right of access to federal courts by requiring
the submission and favorable action by the institutional welfare
officer before a writ could be filed..2 7 Relying on the former 28
U.S.C. § 461 (now part of 28 U.S.C.§ 2243), which authorized
the court to dispose of a party to a habeas proceeding "as law and
justice requires," a federal court held that where a prisoner,
though in lawful custody, has suffered bodily injury from assaults
by guards and other inmates ". . . the judge is not limited to a
simple remand or discharge of the prisoner, but he may remand
with directions that the prisoner's retained civil rights be respected. 21 Even before the Supreme Court decision in Johnson
v. Avery, 211 invalidating a prison regulation prohibiting inmates
from assisting other inmates in the preparation of writs, on a
petition of habeas corpus, a federal court declared that a regula22 1
tion prohibiting "jailhouse lawyers" was unconstitutional.
Here, though the petitioner asked for injunctive relief against the
regulation under the Civil Rights Act, because he additionally
requested release from solitary confinement, the court considered
the pleadings as a petition for habeas corpus, and granted both
requests for relief. Habeas corpus proceedings have also obtained
for inmates the right to enjoy the assistance of counsel at parole
22
revocation hearings. '
Habeas corpus has, on several occasions, been invoked to
gain release from a maximum security, segregation, or similar
222
unit of a prison and restoration to the general population.
216. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F. 2d 443 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
217. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
218. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F. 2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
219. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
220. Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 409 F. 2d 1337

(5th Cir. 1969).
221. Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973).
222. E.g., Landman v. Peyton, 370 F. 2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 11

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 23 the Supreme Court ruled that

while habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for restoration of
forfeited good time credit, had the inmates sought money
damages, a § 1983 action would be the only appropriate remedy.
Four days after the decision of the Supreme Court was announced, a federal court ruled in a civil rights action to recover
on a monetary claim for restoration of good time credit that a
prison warden is immune from damages under § 1983 when he
reasonably relies upon the validity of prison practices, subsequently determined unconstitutional, and acts without malice.
The defense of good faith defeated the inmate's claim for monetary relief.22
VI.

DISCOVERY

The purpose of discovery is to insure a fairer law contest, to
promote justice and truth, and to eliminate surprise by the disclosure of relevant facts.
Generally, significant use of prisoners' rights litigation will
require extensive use of the liberal discovery techniques provided
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resorted to without pomp
and ceremony in civil rights actions. Discovery in a habeas corpus
proceeding is far more doubtful. Rule 81 (a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Federal Rules are applicable to habeas proceedings to the extent that the practice in
such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States
and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions. In
Harris v. Nelson,2 the Supreme Court held that this rule excludes the application of the discovery techniques provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to habeas corpus. The Court
further held that the district courts may authorize an interrogatory or other discovery device where reasonably fashioned to elicit
facts to help the court "dispose of the matter as law and justice
require." Though 28 U.S.C. § 2246226 provides for interrogatories
only in limited circumstances, the Court held that this restriction
223.
224.
225.
226.

-

411 U.S. 475 (1973).
Clarke v. Cady, 358 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
394 U.S. 286 (1969).
28 U.S.C. § 2246 provides:
On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally
or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are
admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to
the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.
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was applicable only to litigants and not to the courts. 22
Having deciphered the language of Rule 81 (a) (2), Harrisleft
the lower federal courts with the task of setting guidelines for
determining the difference between a deposition taken for evidence and one taken for purposes of routine discovery under

§ 2246.228
One reason for narrowly construing any provisions for discovery in habeas corpus proceedings is that since the petitioner had
only limited discovery available to him during the state criminal
proceedings, it would not be consistent with that policy for complete discovery to be available on a collateral attack of the conviction. However, when habeas corpus is used to challenge prison
conditions, in the same manner as civil rights actions are used,
it is just as inconsistent to allow routine discovery in one action
and not the other. This issue appears to assume the posture of yet
another battle between form and substance.
Expedience, therefore, requires avoiding the necessity of obtaining a court order for routine discovery, by bringing a prisoners' rights action under § 1983. However, a prisoner is handicapped by the nature of his confinement and it is often difficult
for him to get the evidence necessary on his own.229
227. Prior to the Harriscase, § 2246 was interpreted both liberally and restrictively.
Compare Wilson v. Harris, 378 F. 2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967), and Sullivan v. United States,
198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. N.Y. 1961) with Knowles v. Gladden, 254 F. Supp. 643 (D. Ore.
1965), aff'd, 378 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1967).
228. Some federal courts had, prior to Harris,permitted discovery to the petitioner:
see, e.g., Wilson v. Weigel, 387 F. 2d 632 (9th Cir. 1967) (oral deposition allowed, but only
because it constituted evidence within § 2246, not discovery); United States ex rel. Seals
v. Wiman, 304 F. 2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963) (admission of
fact under Rule 36 on the grounds that habeas corpus is a civil procedure.) Others had
not; see e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. N.Y. 1961) (interrogatory);
United States v. Burdette, 161 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Mich. 1957), aff'd, 254 F. 2d 610 (6th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 976 (1959) (medical examination).
229. The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules appointed by the Chief Justice for
a study of procedural rules has suggested the following:
Rule 6. Discovery
(a) LEAvE OF COURT REQUIRED. A party shall be entitled to invoke the
processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if,
and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good
cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise. If necessary for effective
utilization of discovery procedures, counsel shall be appointet by the judge for
a petitioner who qualifies for the appointment of counselunder 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A.
(b) REQUESTS FOR DIscoVERY. Requests for discovery shall be accompanied
by a statement of the questions, interrogatories, or requests for admission sought
to be answered and a list of the documents, if any, sought to be produced.
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CONCLUSION

In deciding whether to contest prison conditions or practices
by means of habeas corpus or the Civil Rights Act, considerations
must include both the relief desired and the type of petitioner.
The doctrine of exhaustion applicable to habeas corpus and the
restrictive discovery techniques available in habeas corpus proceedings, make it attractive only if release is the remedy sought.
While class actions may be permitted in a habeas corpus proceeding, it is doubtful whether any court would grant such extraordinary relief to an entire class of inmates. However, as the scope of
habeas corpus relief expands and penetrates the traditional
breadth of civil right actions it will be permitted in those habeas
proceedings which could have been brought as § 1983 actions as
well. The question then will be which members of the class will
be subject to the exhaustion requirement.
The right of litigants to choose which action to pursue and
to choose a forum for the hearing of their claims has recently been
severely impeded. The concern over permitting prisoners to use
§ 1983 as an alternative to habeas corpus, thereby circumventing
the exhaustion requirement, has manifested itself in a Supreme
Court decision that has only added to the confusion of prisoners
who most often must commence any action pro se. The Rodriguez
court attempted to make a distinction between actions challenging the fact or duration of imprisonment and those challenging
the conditions of confinement. While it is quite true that the
respondents were seeking restoration of good time credits which,
if granted, would result in their immediate release from custody,
this analysis defines the type of relief sought rather than the
challenged aspect of his confinement. Indeed, the respondents
were challenging the constitutionality of the disciplinary procedures which resulted in the cancellation of their earned good conduct time credit. It is well established that challenges to prison
disciplinary procedures are cognizable in § 1983 actions. Indeed,
the court ruled that had the respondents sought monetary relief
their only course would be to pursue a civil rights suit. Thus it is
(c) EXPENSES. If the respondent is granted leave to take the deposition of
the petitioner or any other person the judge may as a condition of taking it direct
that the respondent pay the expenses of travel and subsistence and fees of
counsel for the petitioner to attend the taking of the deposition.
The Committee Note indicates that subdivision (a) was drafted to be consistent with
Harrisv. Nelson. PreliminaryDraft of ProposedRules Governing Habeas CorpusProceedings for the United States District Courts, printed in 356 F. Supp. (1973).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/11

38

et al.: Prisoners' Rights Litigation: An Examination into the Appurtenant

Prisoners' Rights
clear that it is not whether the attack is one based on the fact of
length of the detention or the conditions under which a prisoner
is held in custody that determines the appropriate action to be
commenced. What matters is only the bottom line: what type of
relief is sought. While the Court did not achieve the distinction
it sought to make, a distinction it missed entirely is that between
the unconditional release of an inmate who was unlawfully imprisoned in the first place, and preserving for an inmate, who was
lawfully convicted and imprisoned, the right to enjoy whatever
privileges are provided for in the state statutory scheme. It is the
difference between challenging the validity of an entire sentence
and challenging the adequacy of prison disciplinary procedures
and the arbitrary revocation of that which was earned by an
inmate pursuant to state regulations. It is the difference between
the "core of habeas corpus" and the kernel of § 1983. As the
Rodriguez dissent ably made manifest, the Court's approach to
prisoners' rights litigation results in a panoply of pragmatic procedural problems when a prisoner seeks several forms of relief for
the same constitutional infirmity. When the consequences of an
unconstitutional disciplinary procedure include the forfeiture of
good time credit an inmate can seek monetary relief in federal
court but must begin in state court to have the lost credit restored. The factual determinations necessitated by both actions
are the same. This is overburdensome on the court and a waste
of the court's time. Worse, it can serve only to further aggravate
federal-state court relations. The doctrine of comity militates
against this result. Indeed, the Court in deciding that § 1983 is
not an appropriate vehicle for a suit seeking restoration of cancelled good time credit should have borne in mind their own
words: "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people as guardians of the
people's federal rights ....
230. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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